Whether Alford ventriloquizes Lévinas correctly or in error seems curiously beside the point after reading this book. In order to contest Alford's interpretation (and many readers may wish to do so), one must engage Alford's contention that Lévinas' non-mythic (and postmodern) reconstruction of a religious and philosophical commitment to the Other cannot take place alongside the "infinitization" of the Other, both more and less human (p. 9). Such a task can certainly be done. But to read this book one doesn't need to settle this score. Alford's engagement with Lévinas is in itself a somewhat Lévinasian encounter, certainly not with Lévinas, but with the psychoanalytic, philosophical, and political "said" that Lévinas opposed to his ethical idea of the "saying."

Alford's essay, therefore, is more akin to thinking out the Lévinasian limits and possibilities within these discourses than it is an exegesis of Lévinas. The reader looking for that approach should start elsewhere, with Critchley (1999), Chanter (2001), Caygill (2002), Llewelyn (1995), or Peperzak (1993). As Lévinas realized, prophecy itself must be leavened with justice and law without ever making either alternative a totality. The solution was for each to show the impossibility of the other. Alford offers an antidote to the prophetic and messianic Lévinas, one worth tasting while abandoning all hope for a permanent cure.

Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller
University of Hawai'i

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The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations. Edited by John T. Jost and Brenda Major. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2001. 477 pp. $29.

Beliefs about political legitimacy have long been central to social theory and theories of democratic governance. A large amount of social-psychological research has also begun to converge on them, driven by traditional theories of

equity, relative deprivation, and social identity. This volume is the first coherent organization of this research, and it should become the primary source for the social psychology of legitimacy. The editors' introductory chapter is a particularly clear and helpful presentation of the diverse approaches represented here.

The sociologist Morris Zelditch begins with a useful discussion of legitimacy as a concept in the history of ideas. The "conflict theories" of Machiavelli and Marx generated the false consciousness hypothesis, which is the primary focus of this book. It begins with two key assumptions. First, all societies contain inequalities among groups; some are privileged and others are disadvantaged. Second, the primary basis of political action should lie in rational self-interest, with each group behaving politically in its own interests. As a result, the real interests of rulers and ruled should be in conflict, with dominant groups striving to perpetuate their own privileges and subordinate groups challenging their disadvantage. To forestall challenges from subordinate groups, rulers cynically and strategically create ideologies, mýths, and rituals to mask their real interests and legitimize their privileged positions. In practice, however, subordinate groups seem to accept those legitimizing myths to a surprising degree, contrary to their own group interests. This "false consciousness" ensures their obedience and inhibits challenge to the status quo, maintains the stability of the social order, and so perpetuates their subordination.

Moderators of false consciousness. The question addressed by most of these authors is why subordinate groups buy into this false consciousness. Put in the formalistic language of social psychology, what moderators explain the effectiveness of legitimizing myths?

First, social identity theory focuses on the structural characteristics of the situation. Russell Spears et al. suggest that low-status groups are more likely to accept inequality when there is a strong "social reality" in the form of clear, well-established, non-overlapping status differences between their group and a higher-status outgroup. Vincent Yzerbyt and Anouk Rogier find that the perceived entitativity of a low-status group (i.e., perceiving it as a tight, cohesive unit) can contribute to "essentialist" beliefs justifying its status, such as stereotypes about genetic shortcomings. According to Naomi Ellemers, a social structure with permeable group boundaries allows occasional individual mobility out of lower-status groups, but it may generate negative stereotypes among the upwardly mobile themselves, lending legitimacy to group inequality. According to Stephen Wright, allowing token mobility may discourage collective action among the successful tokens themselves; even when angered by the collective injustice of mere tokenism, they may be unwilling to jeopardize their own shaky privileges.

Second, subordinate groups' prior beliefs about the stratification system also can induce them to accept inequality as legitimate. James Olson suggests that their expression of group resentments is inhibited by beliefs in a just world, that they personally are not the victims of discrimination (even if they perceive that their group as a whole is), and by pressures toward self-presentation as likable and

competent. Brenda Major points to cognitive construals: Condemning their lesser outcomes as illegitimate may enhance self-esteem (I'm not responsible for my failures, I'm just a victim) but may have longer-term psychological costs. John Jost et al. suggest that psychological pressures to justify the existing system prevent low-status groups from using ingroup favoritism as a vehicle for self-enhancement. Jim Sidanius et al. point to variation in social dominance orientation as contributing to dissension within low-status groups about the wisdom of challenges to inequality.

A third category of moderators concerns the dominant groups' perceptions of individuals in low-status groups, and so are less relevant to the false consciousness hypothesis. Cecilia Ridgeway notes that ordinary interaction with low-status groups can confirm stereotypes about their attributes and material resources, legitimizing structural inequality. From balance theory, Chris Crandall suggests that people who receive bad but controllable outcomes are regarded as suffering legitimately bad fates. Peter Glick and Susan Fiske describe an "ambivalent" prejudice against low-status groups, involving both hostility and benevolence, that is more easily defended than purely hostile stereotypes, and so can contribute to the legitimacy of inequality.

The idealistic hope behind much of this work is that subordinate groups will see through the illusory legitimizing myths fostered by dominant groups to a "true" consciousness more in harmony with their own real interests, and will then mobilize collectively to pursue them. Herbert Kelman cites several examples of at least temporarily successful challenges to inequality: the role of liberation theology in the Catholic Church in legitimizing a new self-concept for the oppressed; the legitimizing by ruling governments of organizations previously defined as terrorist, such as the ANC, IRA, or PLO, allowing them to be accepted as negotiating partners; and the delegitimation of Yitzhak Rabin by the Israeli right, perhaps facilitating his assassination.

Further questions about false consciousness. Of course, even the fine contributions to this volume cannot explore all aspects of a topic as far-reaching and complex as false consciousness, much less political legitimacy more broadly considered. This raises a number of further questions.

First, the sociopsychological assumptions underlying the false consciousness hypothesis come from realistic group conflict theory: To be rational, members of subordinate groups should act in the service of their group's material interests, and, in the absence of legitimating myths, should act self-interestedly against their group's disadvantages. But in relying so heavily on realistic group conflict theory, these social psychologists may have picked a losing theoretical horse. Much research shows that "real" self-interest usually has rather little effect on ordinary individuals' political preferences, regardless of whether they belong to dominant or subordinate groups. In politics, ordinary people of any status seem usually to weigh sociotropic and principled considerations more heavily than they do their interests.

Second, the adjective "false" implies that "real" consciousness ought to be something quite different. Moreover, the terms "'real' interests and 'false consciousness' presuppose an objective observer" who can discern the real interests of the ruled classes (Zelditch, p. 43), something that social scientists presume to be able to do but subordinate individuals cannot, or at least do not. That claim to a superior understanding of the subordinates' consciousness may not be welcomed. An air of condescension inevitably accompanies claims that subordinate groups' expressed preferences are "false," and that they are not capable of assessing reality for themselves. Subordinate groups not infrequently resist the insights of the intelligentsia of the political left, as seen in the many failures of worker-student alliances.

What then about the consciousness of ruling groups? Machiavelli felt that "the fundamental idea is that the function of legitimacy is to mask the real interests of the ruling class . . . the use by rulers of legitimating myths is purely strategic." Marx, however, was inconsistent about "whether a dominant ideology is a conscious (or unconscious) conspiracy of the ruling class or merely an expression of the structure of objective class relations" (Zelditch, pp. 42–43). The language throughout this volume quite explicitly assumes elites to be consciously and strategically masking their own interests. But this assumption remains unexamined, indeed perhaps untestable, by a discipline relying primarily on college student subjects and occasional general population surveys.

Ordinary members of dominant groups also are assumed to adopt legitimizing myths instrumentally, to protect their privileged positions. That raises three issues for me. First, the notion of motivated acceptance of such myths implies a specific causal hypothesis: The motive to protect privilege causes acceptance of the legitimizing myth. The experimental studies dominating this volume tell us that such motives *can*, in an experiment, have that effect, but not whether they normally *do* in the real world. Cross-sectional surveys such as those presented by Jost, Sidanius, and their colleagues tell us the two are correlated, but cannot tell us which is causally prior. Second, that instrumental process would seem to require that their identities as members of the dominant group, the accompanying privileges, and the threats to those privileges from restless subordinates are all salient and important to members of dominant groups. Do these variables moderate dominant groups' acceptance of legitimizing myths? Some "myths," such as negative group stereotypes and the Protestant ethic, seem more likely to be acquired fairly early in life through some simple social learning of cultural values, before such complex cognitive processes develop. Third, in considerable research on both general population and student samples, we find very little self-conscious ethnic group identity among the dominant white Americans, and almost no political impact of it.

Experimental social psychology often proceeds by simulating contemporary real-world phenomena and importing simplified replicas into the laboratory, to study their dynamics under more controlled conditions. The historical cases that

fit the false consciousness hypothesis best would seem to be static social systems in which large, defined groups of people are permanently subordinated with relatively few opportunities for mobility, such as feudalism, the class-based industrial society of a century ago, or the race-based caste systems of slavery and Jim Crow. Not surprisingly, then, the implicit success story throughout the volume seems to be the American civil rights movement, which successfully challenged the Jim Crow mythology, delegitimated it, opened the door for broad collective action, and overthrew that system.

It is not so clear that the false consciousness hypothesis speaks as well to our post-colonial era, with its global economy and multinational corporations, disintegrating nation-states in the former Yugoslavia, in Africa, and in the Middle East, and numerous internal rebellions of Chechyns, Indonesian Muslims, Tamils, Palestinians, and in Colombia and numerous other locales. Of course, greedy large corporations, corrupt elites, and brutal dictators remain, and represent compelling examples of how dominant elites exploit ordinary people, and their utter cynicism about doing so. Their lawyers and spinmeisters too can concoct many plausible and even persuasive excuses for why their actions serve the general good. But the static social systems of the 19th-century European class order or Jim Crow seem somewhat dated as replicas of contemporary society that can be transported into the social-psychological laboratory.

Beyond false consciousness. The false consciousness hypothesis largely stands alone on center stage here, as when the editors say, "the primacy function of ideological thought, in general, is to legitimate ideas and actions that might otherwise be objectionable" (p. 6), and describe the volume as intended to illuminate "the ways in which people maintain social inequality through stereotypes, justifications, rationalizations, and legitimizing ideologies" (p. 8). Yet at certain junctures a broader view emerges, that "there is a bright side and a dark side to issues of legitimacy" (p. 5), and that legitimacy can lead both to "extreme acts of exploitation, violence, and evil" (p. 5) and to loyalty, satisfaction with consensual rules and laws, positive work environments, and "justice, progress, and social change" (p. 12).

This broader view emerges from the "consensus theories" of legitimacy originating with Aristotle and developed by the sociologists Parsons and Lipset. They emphasize the voluntary acceptance of the existing social order based on norms and values shared by rulers and ruled alike. That consensus promotes legitimacy and, as a result, a stable social and political order. This more constructive role of legitimacy gets only passing attention here, however. Tom Tyler shows that authorities' decisions receive more loyalty and obedience when they are perceived as engaging in fair decision-making procedures, treating followers with dignity and respect, even when the decisions actually disadvantage those affected. Kimberly Elsbach similarly argues that even decisions with negative effects are accepted more when authorities communicate consideration and respect. In both cases, recipients' perceptions of legitimacy are key mediators.

The general omission of the socially positive effects of legitimacy emphasized by consensus theories seems odd today. Legitimacy was a major preoccupation of political scientists and sociologists in the post-colonial, nation-building era after the Second World War. A society in which there is no legitimate authority quickly devolves into a Hobbesian world of all against all, a world seen in many locales around the globe today. In this volume, Tyler seems to be something of an outlier in claiming that "legitimizing myths" can provide necessary public support to a reasonably just political and legal system, in which fair decision-making procedures can produce public trust and respect, and thereby loyalty and obedience. Perhaps it can remind us that there is a politics of the study of legitimacy, as in the study of almost anything in political psychology.

David O. Sears
University of California, Los Angeles

The Social Psychology of Politics. Edited by Victor C. Ottati, R. Scott Tindale, John Edwards, Fred B. Bryant, Linda Heath, Daniel C. O'Connell, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, and Emil J. Posavac. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. 2002. 244 pp.

Two of the most important developments in political psychology of the last two decades have been the advance of political cognition and identity theories. The cognitive perspective has helped political psychologists understand information processing and decision-making in citizens and political elites alike. Identity theories, in particular social identity theory, have helped us understand the group origins of political behavior. Together these perspectives shed light on important questions in public opinion and voting behavior, including questions about the role of stereotypes, dispositions, emotions, verbal and nonverbal cues, and agenda effects, to name only a few topics.

In this edited volume, Ottati et al. bring together research from the cognitive and identity perspectives, research that addresses many of the aforementioned topics. The presentation of both perspectives in a single volume is in itself remarkable; many books discuss cognition or identity, but not both. Add to this feature the strong cast of scholars, and what you have is a very worthwhile book, one that is definitely recommended reading for political psychologists.

The book consists of 11 chapters, in three sections addressing candidate evaluation, public opinion/public policy, and collective political action, respectively. Most of the chapters provide summaries of the literature, with some presenting new evidence. This format is simultaneously a strength and weakness of the book. On one hand, the summaries are done competently and are an excellent way for novices to obtain a quick view of the literature. This is particularly useful for graduate students and advanced undergraduate students who are just starting to think about the topics addressed in this volume. Indeed, several of the chapters would

make excellent reading material in courses on political psychology, voting behavior, public opinion, or collective political action. On the other hand, those who are looking for new research may be disappointed. Apart from the chapters by Huddy and Capelos, Abrams and Randsley de Moura, and Kameda, Hulbert, and Tindale, there is not much new research here.

The editors' goal is to bring more psychologically realistic explanations to the conventional political science understanding of voting behavior, public opinion, and collective action. In keeping with this goal, many of the chapters focus extensively on insights from social psychology and how they relate to politics. While this could easily produce a tendency to reduce the political to the psychological, the volume avoids this pitfall by being cognizant of the role that political institutions and norms play in shaping political behavior and outcomes.

A nice feature of this book is that it covers a fair amount of ground. While there surely are gaps, the book is remarkably complete (perhaps because it focuses on summarizing extant research as opposed to presenting new evidence). One finds topics here that are not generally covered in works on political cognition and identity, such as nonverbal cues, political eloquence, and procedural effects on small-group decision-making. The individual chapters, too, tend to be complete. They highlight the research efforts of the authors, placing those efforts in a broader theoretical context that permits the reader to get a sense of the lay of the field. In the first two sections of the book, introductory chapters provide readers with a bird's eye view of the literature, which prepares them for the subsequent chapters and also fills in gaps that remain unaddressed in those chapters. My only complaint here is that I would have liked to see a similar chapter for the section on collective political action.

The book opens with a chapter by Victor Ottati, Robert Wyer, Megan Deiger, and David Houston, "The Psychological Determinants of Candidate Evaluation and Voting Preference." This chapter is a nice overview of the field of political cognition as it relates to candidate evaluation. It focuses both on the process of candidate evaluation and on the substantive considerations that enter this process. This second focus sets the chapter apart from other reviews of political cognition. The chapter is fairly complete, although I would have liked to see a more extensive discussion of associative network models as well as a consideration of the ambivalence literature. However, overall this chapter is an excellent introduction to political cognition.

Leonie Huddy and Theresa Capelos contribute the second chapter, "Gender Stereotyping and Candidate Evaluation: Good News and Bad News for Women Politicians." This chapter provides an excellent summary of the literature on gender stereotypes and their effect on candidate evaluation. It also familiarizes readers with Kunda's parallel processing model of stereotypes, which has received relatively little attention in political psychology. The chapter engages new data (at least data that have not been published in previous articles) to test the implications of the parallel processing model. The results give cause for both pessimism and optimism about the electoral fortunes of female candidates. On one hand,

gender stereotypes exist and matter. On the other hand, these stereotypes do not have to overpower; indeed, they themselves may be overpowered by partisan stereotypes or by individuating information about female candidates.

Linda Isbell and Ottati contribute "The Emotional Voter: Effects of Episodic Affective Reactions on Candidate Evaluation." This chapter attests to the increased importance that has been accorded to emotions in political judgment and choice. The main emphasis here is on mood as opposed to emotion, although the chapter has plenty to say about the latter as well. The chapter provides a good introduction to the affect literature as it relates to candidate evaluation, although I would have preferred to see a bit more attention to the recent insights from social-cognitive neuroscience.

Ottati and Megan Deiger write about "Visual Cues and the Candidate Evaluation Process." While there can be little doubt that nonverbal communication plays an essential role in politics, this topic has hitherto received little attention in reviews of psychological theories of politics. Thus, its inclusion adds greatly to the present volume. Particularly useful is the chapter's distinction between static and dynamic visual cues, as this provides a nice partitioning of the literature.

Daniel O'Connell and Sabine Kowal's chapter on "Political Eloquence" continues the theme of communication as it relates to political cognition. This chapter reviews extant research (mostly by the authors) and methodological issues in the analysis of speech by politicians. The chapter does a fine job at stating the distinction between literacy and orality in speech acts, but it could have said more about the political relevance of eloquence (e.g., does it matter to voters?). I also would have liked to see reference to the deliberative aspect of eloquence, as this is an important theme in political philosophy.

The second section of the book opens with "The Psychological Determinants of Public Opinion" by Linda Skitka and Elizabeth Mullen. This chapter serves as a valuable introduction to the political psychology of public opinion. It discusses the structure and determinants of public opinion, while also engaging measurement issues in survey research. Although some topics such as motivated reasoning are missing, in all this is a very useful overview of the key issues and themes in public opinion research.

Felicia Pratto and Christie Cathey write about "The Role of Social Ideologies in Legitimizing Political Attitudes and Public Policy." This chapter complements the chapter by Skitka and Mullen nicely, in that it addresses a different aspect of public opinion—social dominance orientation (SDO). The chapter does an excellent job at situating SDO in the broader literature. It then summarizes several key studies that shed light on the mechanisms by which SDO influences policy attitudes. This is a nice introduction to the SDO literature, although this chapter is also one of the few places in which I discovered a major editing mistake (an apparent sign reversal in Figure 1).

The next chapter is somewhat of an outlier in the book. Leonard Jason, Renee Taylor, and Judith Richman write about "The Role of Science and Advocacy

Regarding a Chronic Health Condition: The Case of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome." This chapter would have been better suited in a volume dedicated to health psychology, as its primary focus is on the definition of chronic fatigue syndrome and its stigmatizing effects. Although problem definitions, including those of diseases, are inherently political, this chapter fails to engage the political aspect. It also fails to engage the cognitive and identity aspects of definitions of disease, and so it remains dissociated from the rest of the volume.

The remaining chapters concern collective political action. Christine Smith and Polly Diven's chapter, "Minority Influence and Political Interest Groups," asks under what circumstances minorities can influence majorities. This chapter is interdisciplinary research at its best: It builds a bridge between the interest group literature in political science and the group processes literature in psychology. The chapter suffers only in that it is sometimes too succinct, as in the discussion of the role of money in gaining political influence, which is more complicated than the authors make it sound.

Dominic Abrams and Georgina Randsley de Moura discuss "The Psychology of Collective Political Protest." This chapter engages social identity theory as well as more cognitive models of the decision to join protests, and as such is the only chapter in the book that spans both political cognition and identity theory. The chapter presents an excellent review of the literature and then adds some new insights and evidence about the moderating effect of social identity on the relationship between perceived efficacy and support for protest. Students of social movements will find this chapter particularly useful.

The book concludes with a chapter by Tatsuya Kameda, Lorne Hulbert, and Scott Tindale, "Procedural and Agenda Effects on Political Decisions by Small Groups." This chapter is of considerable interest because it integrates psychological studies of small-group decision-making (in particular, polarization effects) with social choice theory. The chapter summarizes past research on the social decision scheme and the social judgment scheme and then presents new evidence to account for previous findings. My only qualm regarding this chapter is that it seems premised on the idea that decision-makers have fixed preferences. While this is true in some contexts, it might not be in others, and in those cases a more deliberative lens might be better able to account for group decision processes.

In all, this is an excellent book. Despite minor quibbles, this book covers the social psychology of politics very well. On the whole, the chapters are of a very high quality and they complement each other nicely. This is definitely recommended reading for political psychologists.

Marco R. Steenbergen
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill